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FOREWORD: THE FABULOUS INVALID 
NEARS 100 
LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK* 
Now in its ninety-seventh year,1 and under no imminent threat from a 
Democratic Congress and a Democratic President, the federal income tax is 
nearly assured of surviving until its one-hundredth birthday in 2013. It was not 
always so clear that the tax would reach that milestone. In public opinion polls 
from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, a plurality of respondents consistently 
identified the income tax as “the worst tax—that is, the least fair.”2 In the mid-
1990s the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee repeatedly 
expressed his desire to “tear the income tax out by its roots and throw it 
overboard.”3 In 1998 the House of Representatives did what it could to grant his 
wish, voting in favor (by a margin of 219 to 209) of a bill to terminate the 
federal income tax at the end of 2002 (with the tax to be replaced by some 
unspecified new federal tax).4 Despite all the unhappiness and all the attacks, 
the fabulous invalid is still with us and shows no signs of imminent departure.5 
The approach of the centenary of the federal income is the occasion for the 
historical articles in this symposium, focusing on crucial moments in the 
development of the tax. This introduction provides a preview of the symposium 
contributions, followed by some speculations on the chances of the income tax 
surviving for a second hundred years (or at least for a few more decades). 
 
*The Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Upon the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, in 1913, 
Congress quickly enacted the first modern federal income tax, the Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 
114. 
 2. Karlyn Bowman, Amer. Enter. Inst., Public Opinion on Taxes 7–8 (2009), available at 
http://aei.org/docLib/AEI-Public-Opinion-Studies-Taxes-2009.pdf (summarizing results of ORC and 
Gallup polls asking respondents to choose from among four taxes: federal income tax, state income tax, 
state sales tax, and local property tax). In the 1990s local property taxes were slightly more unpopular 
than the federal income tax, and in the 2000s local property taxes were more unpopular than the 
federal income by a wide margin. Id. at 8 (summarizing results of Gallup polls). 
 3. Barbara Kircheimer, Archer Addresses Contract Compromises and Reforms, 66 TAX NOTES 
1083, 1083 (1995) (quoting Bill Archer). 
 4. Tax Code Termination Act, H.R. 3097, 105th Cong. (passed by the House of Representatives, 
June 17, 1998). 
 5. The Broadway theater is commonly described as a “fabulous invalid” because it “seems to have 
played more death scenes than the body count in ‘Hamlet,’ only to be resurrected time and again.”  
Patty Hartigan, Terms of Theater Endearment, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1996, at C3. 
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I 
THE FIRST CENTURY 
Tax lawyers—practitioners and academics alike—have long been interested 
in federal income tax history, but only in history of certain kinds. They are 
interested in any history that is instrumentally useful to a tax lawyer—including, 
most obviously and most importantly, legislative history helpful in interpreting 
the provisions of the current Internal Revenue Code. In the spirit of 
Christopher Columbus Langdell and his case method of legal instruction,6 they 
are also interested in the leading Supreme Court income tax opinions, even 
when it is far from clear that knowledge of the cases is crucial—or even useful—
in practicing tax law today. One could, for example, probably have a more-than-
adequate practical understanding of the realization doctrine as it operates today 
without ever having heard of Eisner v. Macomber,7 but every tax practitioner is 
nevertheless well acquainted with the case. 
A great deal of tax history is not within either of these categories of tax 
lawyers’ history, and so is little known. What might be called “losers’ tax 
history”—tax roads considered by Congress but not taken, or taken briefly and 
then abandoned—is particularly obscure. In the past decade or two, however, 
the interest of academic tax lawyers in federal income tax history has grown 
beyond merely instrumental history and the histories of the great cases. The 
scholarly pioneers in this area—including many of the contributors to this 
symposium8—have taken their tax lawyers’ understanding and appreciation of 
technical detail and applied it beyond the usual narrow scope of tax lawyers’ 
historical interests.9 
 
 6. See generally Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which 
They Are Not to Take as Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early 
C.C. Langdell, 1870–1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57 (1999). 
 7. 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (concluding that the taxation of unrealized gains was not authorized by the 
Sixteenth Amendment and holding that the taxation of stock dividends was unconstitutional as a tax on 
unrealized appreciation). 
 8. See, e.g., STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES: 
AMERICA’S UNCERTAIN TRADITION OF WARTIME FISCAL SACRIFICE (2008); Joseph J. Thorndike, 
“The Unfair Advantage of the Few”: The New Deal Origins of Soak the Rich Taxation, in THE NEW 
FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 29 (Isaac Martin, 
Ajay K. Mehrotra & Monica Prasad eds., 2009); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare 
Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED 
INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN FAMILIES 15 (Bruce Meyer & Douglas Holtz-
Eakin eds., 2001); Anne L. Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in the 
Twenties: The 1924 Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon Plan, 59 TAX L. REV. 373 (2006); 
Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 167 (2002); Charlotte Crane, Pennington v. Coxe: A Glimpse at the Federal Government in the 
Early Republic, 23 VA. TAX REV. 417 (2003); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of 
Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819 (2002); 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: U.S. Attitudes Towards Wealth and the Income Tax, 
70 IND. L.J. 119 (1994); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Materialism, 83 IND. L.J. 881 
(2008); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists 
and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005). 
 9. Joseph Thorndike, alone among the contributors to this symposium, is not a lawyer.  I hope he 
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This symposium features nine articles in this spirit of broadened historical 
inquiry, shedding light on some lesser-known aspects of the history of the 
federal income tax. Some of the articles describe roads taken (for example, 
Dennis Ventry’s history of the home mortgage interest deduction), while others 
describe roads not taken (for example, Marjorie Kornhauser’s study of the 
rejection of governmental disclosure of tax-return information of identified 
high-income individuals). Articles of both types enrich our understanding of 
how the federal income tax achieved its current contours. The contributors, as a 
group, share the historian’s view that history is interesting and important for its 
own sake, without regard to whether it happens to contribute to anyone’s 
“presentist agenda.” On the other hand, the contributors are mostly lawyers, 
and as such often cannot (and should not) resist considering the lessons these 
episodes in tax history may offer to policymakers today.  
The articles are presented roughly in the chronological order of the events 
they describe.  Charlotte Crane’s article begins by noting that the federal 
income tax is much more a lawyer’s tax (“so intensely a matter of law and legal 
analysis”) than either the income taxes of other jurisdictions or the several 
nonincome federal taxes.10 She locates the source of the legalistic nature of the 
tax in the Supreme Court’s 1895 opinion in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust 
Co.,11 invalidating the income tax of 1894 as a constitutionally impermissible 
unapportioned direct tax. She describes how the ghost of Pollock hovered over 
the income tax for decades after its reintroduction in 1913, inspiring Eisner v. 
Macomber and other judicial explorations of the constitutional meaning of 
income. In sharp contrast with other recent commentators, who bemoan the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional policing of the early modern income tax, Crane 
makes a powerful argument that more good than harm came out of the Court’s 
intense involvement in the development of the tax. She concludes, “The threat 
of continued [Supreme Court] holdings insisting upon giving constitutional 
content to the meaning of ‘income’ forced the Congress and Treasury to commit 
to a far more consistent and coherent set of rules for defining the tax base.”12 
Ajay Mehrotra’s contribution enriches our understanding of the factors 
contributing to the introduction of the corporate income tax in 1909 and of the 
individual income tax in 1913.13 According to the conventional wisdom, these 
taxes were the products of politics, political institutions, and social forces; 
economic factors play a cameo role (at most) in the standard historical 
accounts. Mehrotra argues convincingly, however, that economic develop- 
 
will take it as a compliment when I observe that his nonlawyer status is not apparent from his 
scholarship. 
 10. Charlotte Crane, Pollock, Macomber and the Role of the Federal Courts in the Development of 
the Income Tax in the United States, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2010). 
 11. 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 12. Crane, supra note 10, at 21. 
 13. Ajay K. Mehrotra, American Economic Development, Managerial Corporate Capitalism, and 
the Institutional Foundations of the Modern American State, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (Winter 
2010). 
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ments—especially the emergence of the modern large-scale industrial 
corporation—were as significant as political and social factors in the enactment 
and development of the taxes. The corporations created the wealth that became 
the targets of the corporate and individual taxes. Beyond that, they provided 
the sophisticated accounting methods and the organizational structures 
required for effective large-scale administration of the taxes. With the 
development of modern corporate accounting, it was possible accurately to 
determine the incomes of corporations, their executives, and their shareholders; 
and with the availability of corporations as withholding agents and providers of 
information returns, it was feasible to collect taxes on those incomes. 
The income tax treatment of gifts is the subject of Richard Schmalbeck’s 
contribution.14 He explains that there are four policy options for the combined 
income tax treatment of a donor–donee pair, and that the best choice among 
the options is not self-evident. Schmalbeck notes that the current income tax 
treatment of noncharitable gifts (nondeductible to the donor, nontaxable to the 
donee) originated with the 1913 income tax. The historical record provides no 
clues as to why Congress opted for that approach in 1913. As frustrating as this 
may be, it is an example of an important phenomenon in the development of 
the income tax. A number of crucial structural decisions made in the early days 
of the income tax, which continue to shape the current income tax, were made 
without (so far as we can now tell) any meaningful deliberation. Schmalbeck 
also provides an illuminating account—in terms of both history and policy—of 
the income tax treatment of appreciation in gratuitously transferred property. 
Joseph Thorndike’s article explores the Keynesian conversion of Treasury 
Department tax-policy experts during the 1930s.15 At the beginning of the Great 
Depression, Thorndike writes, there was no political interest in using tax cuts to 
promote economic recovery. In fact, in 1932 Congress responded to the 
economic emergency by enacting a tax increase in the name of fiscal 
responsibility. By 1937, however, Treasury experts had become persuaded of 
the merits of countercyclical taxation. Ironically, the first legislative experiment 
in Keynesian taxation took the form of a tax increase—the short-lived 1937 tax 
on undistributed corporate profits, intended to stimulate the economy by 
discouraging corporations from hoarding cash. As Thorndike explains, the use 
of income tax cuts as weapons in the countercyclical arsenal requires the 
existence of a tax imposed on the bulk of the population, and the income tax 
did not become a mass tax until World War II. Keynesian tax cuts emerged in 
the postwar era, the product of both the intellectual conversion of the tax 
experts during the 1930s and the creation of the mass income tax during the 
following decade. 
Marjorie Kornhauser’s article rescues from oblivion a fascinating piece of 
 
 14. Richard Schmalbeck, Gifts and the Income Tax—An Enduring Puzzle, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 63 (Winter 2010). 
 15. Joseph J. Thorndike, The Fiscal Revolution and Taxation: The Rise of Compensatory Taxation, 
1929–1938, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (Winter 2010). 
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tax history.16As Kornhauser recounts, legislation enacted in 1934 required all 
income taxpayers to submit “pink slips” with their tax returns. The information 
required by the pink slip—the taxpayer’s name, address, gross income, 
deductions, taxable income, and tax liability—would then be made available for 
public inspection. The disclosure regime was repealed less than one year later, 
largely through the remarkably effective efforts of one person—Raymond 
Pitcairn, a wealthy lawyer. Kornhauser describes a multifaceted public-relations 
campaign, orchestrated by Pitcairn, that would be sophisticated even by today’s 
standards. Two aspects of Pitcairn’s campaign were especially impressive. The 
first was his ability to enlist the zeitgeist in his efforts; the trial of Bruno 
Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby was 
proceeding as Pitcairn was advocating repeal of the disclosure requirement, and 
Pitcairn argued effectively that the disclosure requirement would encourage 
additional kidnappings. The second was his ability to convince Congress and the 
public that repeal was in the interests of the “common man,” despite the 
inconvenient fact that the income tax applied to less than ten percent of the 
population. 
My own article explores another path not taken.17 It is well known that the 
income tax became a mass tax during World War II; it is less well known that 
Congress came close to enacting a federal retail sales tax to help finance the 
war, instead of (or perhaps in addition to) the mass income tax. The article 
describes the competition during the war between the proponents of the income 
tax as the instrument of mass taxation and the proponents of the sales tax 
alternative. It argues that Congress almost certainly would have enacted a 
wartime sales tax, were it not for the implacable—and puzzling—opposition of 
President Roosevelt. But for Roosevelt’s hostility to the sales tax, it is quite 
possible that the United States would have emerged from the war with a sales 
tax as the federal instrument of mass taxation, and with the income tax as a class 
tax imposed only on the affluent. The article suggests that postwar 
developments in federal taxation would have been very different if the United 
States had emerged from the war with a retail-sales-tax-plus-class-income-tax, 
instead of the actual mass income tax. 
Steven Bank’s article describes the fate of post–World War II proposals to 
provide legislative relief from double taxation.18 Although reduction of the 
double-tax burden was frequently on the legislative agenda in the years 
following the war, no relief was enacted until 1954. Even then the relief was 
modest and, in large part, short-lived. Bank flags the parallel with the dividend-
tax relief enacted in 2003, which also fell well short of the elimination of double 
 
 16. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law: How a “Common Man” 
Campaign Ended a Rich Man’s Law, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (Winter 2010). 
 17. Lawrence Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax That Wasn’t: An Actual History and an 
Alternate History, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (Winter 2010). 
 18. Steven A . Bank, The Rise and Fall of Post–World War II Corporate Tax Reform, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (Winter 2010). 
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taxation, and which is scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. Perhaps the last 
word on this topic, as quoted by Bank, belongs to House Ways and Means 
Chairman Robert Doughton. Asked in 1945 about the prospects for double-tax 
relief, Doughton commented, “That’s an old subject and it’s likely to be an old 
one after someone else becomes chairman of this committee.”19 His quip has 
lost none of its timeliness over the past sixty-five years. 
Dennis Ventry’s definitive history of the home mortgage interest deduction 
covers the entire lifespan of the modern income tax.20 The deduction originated 
in 1913, as part of a general provision allowing a deduction for all interest, 
rather than as a specific provision governing home mortgage interest. There is 
no indication that the 1913 Congress intended the interest deduction to 
promote or reward homeownership. Indeed, the deduction could not possibly 
have had any widespread effect on homeownership so long as the income tax 
applied to only a small percentage of the population. The deduction came into 
its own after World War II, as the conversion of the income tax to a mass tax 
made it available to millions of homeowners. By the 1950s the deduction was 
widely recognized by tax-policy experts as a housing subsidy, and just as widely 
denounced as inequitable and inefficient. Ever since then, experts have 
advocated the elimination or radical transformation of the deduction, and 
Congress has ignored their advice. Ventry concludes with a powerful argument 
for repeal of the deduction, but the history he recounts suggests the deduction 
may be immune to even the most powerful arguments against it. The federal in- 
come tax has long featured double taxation of corporate income, with income 
taxed once at the corporate level when earned by the corporation and again at 
the shareholder level when received as a dividend. 
In her article, Anne Alstott critically examines the near-consensus claim 
that the earned income tax credit (EITC) has succeeded in “making work pay” 
for low-wage parents.21 She begins by arguing that the official poverty levels are 
unrealistically low and proposes higher levels based on prevailing social 
judgments as to what constitutes a decent minimum standard of living. Using 
her definition of poverty, she concludes that the EITC makes only a small 
reduction in poverty, does not enable a minimum-wage worker to support 
herself and even one child at or above the poverty level, and does nothing for 
the involuntarily unemployed and others willing but unable to work. Alstott’s 
analysis suggests some intriguing (if ultimately unanswerable) historically based 
questions. If Congress had not enacted the EITC in 1975, would low-wage 
families in the United States be better off or worse off today? Is the EITC, 
despite its inadequacies, the best that Congress is likely ever to do for the 
 
 19. Id. at 214 (quoting Robert H. Doughton, as quoted in John H. Crider, Doubts Tax Cuts Till 
Budget is Met, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1945, at 16). 
 20. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage 
Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (Winter 2010). 
 21. Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 
(Winter 2010). 
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working poor? Or has the EITC taken the edge off of poverty just enough to 
prevent the enactment of a more effective program? 
 
II 
A SECOND CENTURY? 
With the fabulous invalid almost certain to reach its one-hundredth 
birthday, it is time to think about its second century. As Zagar and Evans might 
have asked (at the risk of being no-hit wonders rather than one-hit wonders), in 
the year 2113, will the income tax still be alive?22 The first step in attempting to 
answer the question is definitional: What feature or features make the income 
tax the income tax so that, if those features disappeared, the income tax would 
cease to exist? 
Ask that question of a tax-policy expert, and you will be told that the 
defining features of an income tax are that it taxes saved income (in addition, of 
course, to taxing income devoted to current consumption) and that it taxes the 
investment return on savings.23 The taxation of saved income distinguishes the 
income tax from a consumption tax, and the taxation of investment returns 
distinguishes the income tax from a wage tax. Of course, the actual income tax 
has never reached all saved income or all investment returns. In the early 1980s 
the actual income tax fell so far short of a comprehensive income tax base as to 
lead some to question whether it could still be properly called an income tax.24 
(The Tax Reform Act of 1986 pulled the income tax back from the consumption 
tax brink.25) Similarly, when President George W. Bush’s Advisory Panel on 
Federal Tax Reform presented (as one of two reform options) a proposal for a 
tax adopting the consumption tax approach of immediate deduction of the costs 
of all long-lived business assets, it was careful not to label the proposal an 
income tax.26 
 
 22. RICK EVANS, IN THE YEAR 2525 (EXORDIUM AND TERMINUS) (1969) (“In the year 2525, if 
man is still alive, if woman can survive, they may find . . .”). 
 23. The inclusion in the income tax base of savings and of investment returns follows from the 
standard economist’s definition of a person’s income for a particular period as “the algebraic sum of (1) 
the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of 
property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question.”  HENRY SIMONS, 
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50, 61–62, 206 (1938). 
Although “income” tax and “consumption” tax labels are used to describe distinctly different tax bases 
in the standard usage of experts, there are also—confusingly enough—nonstandard expert usages 
according to which some types of consumption taxes are considered to be income taxes. For a survey of 
such usages, see Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious 
Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 850–54 (1999). 
 24. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein, Back From the Dead: How President Reagan Saved the Income 
Tax, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 207, 219–23 (1986). 
 25. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
 26. The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: 
Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System 163–64 (2005) (describing the expensing of business assets 
under the “Growth and Investment Tax Plan”). 
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History, in addition to expert usage, supports the notion that the taxation of 
investment income is a necessary feature of an income tax. In Pollock v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,27 the Supreme Court held that the federal income 
tax enacted in 189428 was unconstitutional as an unapportioned “direct” tax.29 
The Court reasoned that the tax on investment income (from both real and 
personal property) was an unapportioned direct tax and that the 
unconstitutional tax on investment income could not be severed from the 
otherwise constitutional tax on labor income.30 Congress could have responded 
to Pollock simply by enacting a new tax applicable only to salaries and wages, 
but it considered the taxation of investment income so crucial that it delayed its 
response to Pollock for almost two decades, until ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment made possible the enactment of a valid unapportioned tax “on 
incomes, from whatever source derived,” applicable to both labor and 
investment income.31 
Despite expert usage and history, I doubt if the experts’ notion of what 
distinguishes an income tax from a consumption tax or a wage tax looms very 
large in the public’s conception of what makes the income tax the income tax. I 
suspect the public, if asked,32 would identify four defining features of the federal 
income tax: (1) it is a mass tax, imposed on the bulk of the population; (2) it is 
imposed directly on individuals as taxpayers (as contrasted with the indirect 
effects of a retail sales tax or a value-added tax); (3) it features progressive 
marginal tax rates; and (4) it uses exclusions, deductions, and credits to adjust 
tax liabilities in response to various aspects of taxpayers’ economic 
circumstances. Perhaps the public would also include (as the experts would 
think it should) a fifth feature: (5) its base is income, as distinguished from 
either wages or consumption. My guess, however, is that the fifth feature is 
 
 27. 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 28. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894). 
 29. Apportionment of direct taxes, among the states according to their populations, is required by 
the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 30. 158 U.S. at 635–37. 
 31. As the history recounted in the text suggests, there is a constitutional dimension to the question 
whether a tax is an income tax. If an unapportioned tax is a “direct” tax (within the meaning of U.S. 
CONST. art I, § 2 cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 4), it is constitutional only if it qualifies as a tax on “incomes” 
(within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment). This raises the possibility that some fundamental 
tax reforms, involving the replacement of the income base with a consumption base, could be 
unconstitutional as unapportioned direct taxes not authorized by the Sixteenth Amendment (because 
they are not imposed on “incomes”). See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are 
Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997) (arguing that two commonly 
proposed fundamental tax reforms would be unconstitutional); Zelenak, supra note 24 (arguing the 
contrary position). My interest in this Foreword is not in the meaning of “incomes” as used in the 
Sixteenth Amendment, but rather in the cultural meaning of the federal income tax as that meaning has 
developed over the decades of the tax’s existence. 
 32. There has been extensive public opinion polling on a wide range of tax issues, but to the best of 
my knowledge there has never been any polling concerning what features of the income tax are crucial 
to its identity.  The absence of such polling questions is not surprising because the answers to the 
questions would not reveal whether the respondents supported or opposed those features. 
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considerably less perspicuous to the public than the first four. Whether or not 
the tax base includes investment income is of little or no personal interest to 
most taxpayers because most taxpayers have little or no investment income.33 
Similarly, that the tax base includes some saved income is of little or no 
personal interest to most taxpayers, both because they currently consume the 
bulk of their earnings and because most of what they do save is excluded from 
their tax base under either the rules governing qualified employment-based 
retirement savings or the rules governing individual retirement accounts.34 
If I am right about the public’s sense of what makes the income tax what it 
is, is the public wrong to attach greater significance to four features that do not 
appear in the experts’ definition of an income tax than to the experts’ defining 
feature? The imagined question to the public is about the essence of the income 
tax—what makes the tax what it is—not about the source of the name of the tax. 
If the tax happened to be named after its rate structure instead of its base35—the 
“unflat tax” instead of the “income tax”—that would have no effect on the 
essence of the tax. It is not unusual for things to be named after their incidental 
features rather than their essential features. A Protestant denomination might 
not consider its historical origins in a protest movement to be an essential 
feature of its faith, and its creed might not even mention the protest; yet the 
protest is the source of its name.36 Similarly, the income base of the income tax 
might be no more important—might even be less important—than the other 
four defining features, despite being the source of the name.  
The survival of the core of the current federal tax called the income tax does 
not depend uniquely on whether there continues to be a federal tax with an 
income base. Some prominent scholars plausibly claim that the difference 
between an income base and a consumption base is of only limited significance, 
because (1) taxpayers can and do avoid income taxation of risky investment 
returns by making portfolio adjustments in response to the tax, and (2) the 
unavoidable income taxation of the risk-free rate of return is almost trivial, 
given how low the risk-free rate of return has been over most of the past 
century.37 If those scholars are right, then the income tax base may be the least 
 
 33. On 2006 income tax returns, solidly middle-income taxpayers—with adjusted gross incomes in 
the range of $75,000 to $100,000—reported taxable interest income aggregating only 2.4% of their 
aggregate salaries and wages, reported dividends aggregating only 1.8% of salaries and wages, and 
reported capital gains (including both capital gains distributions and net gains on sales of capital assets) 
aggregating only 3.0% of salaries and wages. Author’s calculations, based on Justin Bryan, Individual 
Income Tax Returns, 2006, 28 STAT. INCOME BULL. 5, 21–22 tbl. 1 (2008). 
 34. I.R.C. §§ 219 (individual retirement accounts), 401 (qualified employment-based retirement 
savings). 
 35. The so-called flat tax, developed by Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka and popularized 
largely by Steve Forbes, is an example of a (proposed) tax named after its rate structure rather than its 
base. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995). 
 36. COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH, “Protestant,” available at 
www.askoxford.com/dictionaries/compact_oed/?view=uk) (stating that the word is derived from the 
dissent of Martin Luther and his followers from the Diet of Spires). 
 37. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1 (2004). But see 
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important of the five defining features of the so-called income tax. In short, it 
would be perfectly reasonable for the public to believe that the taxation of 
income (as contrasted with the taxation of consumption or wages) is not of the 
essence of the current federal income tax. 
Different proposals for substantially modifying or replacing the current 
federal income tax would result in the survival of different numbers of the five 
features of the current tax. The chart on the facing page indicates which 
features would persist following the adoption of five leading reform proposals. 
For purposes of the chart, the first two features of the current income tax—mass 
taxation and direct taxation of individuals—are combined into a single feature, 
mass direct taxation of individuals. This is because any plausible replacement 
for the income tax would have to involve mass taxation; the interesting question 
is whether that mass taxation would be direct (as with the current income tax) 
or indirect (as with a retail sales tax or value-added tax (VAT)). 
The five proposals considered are (1) Michael Graetz’s proposal to 
introduce a federal VAT, retaining the income tax only for those taxpayers with 
six-figure incomes;38 (2) the “Growth and Investment Tax Plan” (GITP), 
featuring immediate deductions for the cost of all long-lived business assets, 
proposed in 2005 by the President’s Tax Reform Panel;39 (3) the “flat tax” 
proposed by Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, which would have two 
components—(a) a flat-rate business tax imposed on a base identical to the base 
of a VAT, except that a deduction for salaries and wages paid would be 
allowed, and (b) a tax imposed on individuals, at the same flat rate, on salaries 
and wages in excess of a rather high exemption level;40 (4) a federal retail sales 
tax (or VAT) introduced as a complete replacement for the federal income 
tax;41 and (5) a “cash flow” consumption tax with progressive marginal tax rates, 
resembling the current income tax except that (a) all savings would be 
deductible and (b) all consumption spending would be taxable (including 
spending financed by savings and spending financed by borrowing).42  
 
Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive 
Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879, 889–90 (2006) (suggesting that the historically low, inflation-
adjusted, risk-free rates of return may not be a good indication of real risk-free rates of return in the 
future). 
 38. Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 
YALE L.J. 261 (2002). 
 39. The President’s Advisory Panel, supra note 27, at 163–64 (describing the treatment of the cost 
of long-lived business assets under the GITP). 
 40. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 36. 
 41. NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE FAIRTAX BOOK (2005) (arguing that the federal income 
tax should be replaced by a federal retail sales tax). 
 42. Edward McCaffery has been the leading academic advocate of such a system. See, e.g., 
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: HOW TO MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER 
(2002). 
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The GITP yes yes yes no
46
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 no no 0 
 
 43. Graetz proposes a single rate for the income tax imposed on six-figure incomes. Graetz, supra 
note 39, at 284. Viewing the VAT and the elite income tax as an integrated system, however, the 
combined rate of the VAT and the income tax (applicable to high-income persons) would be higher 
than the stand-alone rate of the VAT (applicable to low- and moderate-income persons). 
 44. The “no” characterization is debatable. The elite income tax would retain deductions for home 
mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and medical expenses, and a replacement for the earned 
income tax credit (EITC) for low-income workers would be introduced into the payroll-tax system. 
Graetz, supra note 39, at 295–96 (income tax deductions), 290–93 (EITC replacement).  However, for 
the majority of the population neither eligible for the EITC replacement nor subject to the income tax, 
the “no” characterization would clearly be correct. 
 45. The “yes” characterization is debatable because tax would not be imposed on the saved income 
and investments returns of the majority of the population not subject to the elite income tax. On the 
other hand, the bulk of saved income and investment returns would belong to the minority of taxpayers 
subject to the income tax, so the “yes” characterization seems appropriate. 
 46. Actually, the GITP would retain a sort of residual tax on investment returns—a fifteen percent 
tax rate applicable to dividends, capital gains, and interest. The President’s Advisory Panel, supra note 
27, at 152, 159. The panel considered this residual taxation insufficient to justify describing the EITC as 
an income tax, and that judgment seems reasonable. 
 47. Although the flat tax as proposed by Hall and Rabushka has only one positive tax rate, the 
exemption allowance under the wage tax portion of the flat tax functions as a zero bracket. Thus, the 
tax can be understood as really featuring two tax brackets—a zero-rate bracket and one positive-rate 
bracket. In addition, the structure of the wage-tax portion is readily adaptable to the introduction of 
any number of progressive marginal rates, if Congress should so desire. See David F. Bradford, What 
are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 TAX NOTES 383, 385–86 (1988) (describing the “X 
tax,” under which progressive marginal rates would apply to the wage-tax portion of the flat tax). 
 48. Although the flat tax as proposed by Hall and Rabushka does not allow any deductions (other 
than the personal allowances designed to shelter subsistence-level income from the wage tax), there 
would be no technical difficulty in introducing exclusions, deductions, and credits into the wage-tax 
portion of the flat tax. 
 49. The Boortz and Linder sales tax proposal features a “prebate”—a universal refund of the sales 
tax on subsistence consumption—which mimics the effect of a tax with a zero rate on subsistence 
consumption and a single positive rate on above-subsistence consumption. BOORTZ & LINDER, supra 
note 42, at 81–90. 
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As indicated in the right-hand column of the table, two of the proposals that 
would be considered non–income tax proposals under the standard usage of tax 
experts—the GITP and the progressive cash flow tax—actually retain three of 
the four defining features of the current income tax. A proposal that would be 
considered an income tax proposal under standard expert usage—the VAT-
plus-elite-income-tax—retains only two of the four defining features. 
Of course, a glance at the numbers in the right-hand column is not sufficient 
to determine whether the current federal income tax would persist in essence—
even if not in name—if a particular reform proposal were adopted. Even if it 
were reasonable to conclude that the essence of the current tax system survives 
when the replacement system retains a majority of the defining features of the 
current system and that the essence does not survive when the replacement 
system retains only a minority of those features, there would still be the 
problem of how to view a replacement that retains exactly half of those features 
(as in the case of the VAT-plus-elite income tax).51 Moreover, merely counting 
features is not enough to resolve all doubts even if the replacement retains 
three features, or only one feature. Counting is inadequate both because it is 
not necessarily the case that all features are equally significant52 and because in 
 
 50. However, as McCaffery explains, a progressive cash-flow tax will impose a burden on the 
returns to savings of a taxpayer who saves in a low-consumption year to finance a high level of 
consumption in a later year.  Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
807, 814–15 (2005). 
 51. This tie-breaking problem will remind tax lawyers of a certain vintage of the old regulations 
governing when a partnership would be classified as a corporation for federal income tax purposes: the 
regulations identified four crucial characteristics of corporations and indicated that a partnership would 
be treated as a corporation only if it had at least three of those characteristics.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 
(e.g., 1983). 
 52. As shown in the table, the flat tax has only one income-tax-like feature—the mass direct 
taxation of individuals. Although the presence of only one feature suggests the flat tax is not an income 
tax, that conclusion is not inevitable if one puts tremendous weight on that one feature, or on some 
feature not included in the table.  Former Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer wanted 
to replace the income tax with a federal retail sales tax or VAT.  Clay Chandler, Archer Calls for End 
to Income-Based Tax, WASH. POST, June 6, 1995, at D1. Archer’s opposition to income taxation 
extended to the Hall–Rabushka flat tax because he viewed it as a type of income tax: “In my opinion, if 
your wages are going to be taxed before you get them, that’s an income tax.” Jacqueline Rieschick, 
March Madness Spurs Trash Talk on Tax Reform, 78 TAX NOTES 1209, 1210 (1998) (quoting Archer). 
Archer’s remark suggests that, for him, withholding at the source was the essence of income taxation. 
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many cases it is debatable whether a replacement should or should not be 
characterized as retaining a particular feature (a problem suggested by the 
footnotes to eight of the twenty yes-or-no answers in the table). Subject to all of 
these qualifications, however, it would not be unreasonable to conclude both 
(1) that the essence of the current federal income tax would survive the 
adoption of either the GITP or a progressive cash flow tax (despite the loss of 
the experts’ income tax label in both cases), and (2) that the essence of the 
current federal income tax would not survive the adoption of the VAT-plus-
elite income tax (despite the survival of a tax with an income base). 
If one accepts the multi-feature account of the essence of the current federal 
income tax system (despite its undeniable lack of precision), how would one 
evaluate the system’s long-term prospects? Crystal-ball-gazing a century into 
the future may be a hopeless exercise. Who, in 1913, could have predicted the 
events—from the Great Depression, to World War II and the Cold War, to the 
Reagan Revolution—that shaped the development of the income tax in its first 
century? And who has any idea today what the United States will be like in 
2113? (How much of it, for example, will be under water?) Less ambitiously, 
however, it may be possible to make meaningful prognostications over the next 
decade or two. 
The survival of the income tax over that shorter time frame is likely under 
the multi-feature approach to defining survival. By contrast, the survival of the 
income tax would be very doubtful under an approach focused exclusively on 
the propriety (according to the usual terminology of experts) of the continued 
use of the income tax label. Income as a tax base may be in serious trouble over 
the next few decades. The George W. Bush Administration repeatedly 
proposed “Retirement Savings Accounts” (RSAs) and “Lifetime Savings 
Accounts” (LSAs) that would have greatly expanded the availability of wage-
tax treatment for savings.53 The long-term strategy seemed to be a sort of 
slouching away from an income tax base, culminating in a tax system with too 
little remaining taxation of investment income to be fairly described as an 
income tax. Although the Bush Administration did not achieve this goal, and 
the Obama Administration has shown no interest in pursuing it, it is easy to 
imagine future administrations and Congresses—particularly Republican 
ones—reviving RSA and LSA proposals and perhaps prevailing. A tax reward 
for thrifty savers has obvious political appeal, and the incrementalism of the 
approach is more likely to succeed than any attempt to eliminate all vestiges of 
an income tax base in one fell swoop. Although there may be only an 
attenuated connection in the tax arena between intellectual movements and 
 
 53. See, e.g., Patti Mohr, White House Begins Selling Its Tax Cut to Congress, 98 TAX NOTES 631, 
633–34 (2003); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanation of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 
2007 Revenue Proposals 5–10 (2006). Contributions to RSAs and LSAs would not have been 
deductible, but the investment returns would have been permanently tax-exempt. The Bush 
Administration’s RSA and LSA proposals were the inspiration for the “Save for Retirement” and 
“Save for Family” account proposals of the President’s Tax Reform Panel. The President’s Advisory 
Panel, supra note 27, at 119–21, 159. 
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political outcomes, it is also worth noting that income as a tax base has lost 
much of its support among tax-policy experts in the past few decades. A 
generation ago, a comprehensive income tax base was the policy darling of most 
tax-policy experts, but today most experts—including a substantial number on 
the political left—oppose the income tax base.54 All things considered, then, the 
long-term-survival chances for income as the tax base are not particularly good. 
By contrast, the long-term-survival chances for the other defining features 
of the current income tax—mass direct taxation of individuals; significant use of 
exclusions, deductions, and credits; and a modestly progressive marginal tax 
rate structure—seem quite good. As Michael Graetz has wryly observed, in 
recent years Congress has “used the income tax the way [his] mother employed 
chicken soup: as a magic elixir to solve all the nation’s economic and social 
difficulties. If the nation has a problem in access to education, child-care 
affordability, health-insurance coverage, or the financing of long-term care, an 
income tax deduction or credit is the answer.”55 As Graetz explains, the 
attraction is bipartisan—Republicans like almost any tax cut, and Democrats 
realize their favorite spending programs are more politically viable as tax 
expenditures than as direct expenditures.56 Moreover, members of the House 
Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees can increase their campaign 
contributions by sending the message that they are always open to the 
enactment of new tax subsidies.57 And the administrative costs of delivering 
subsidies through the income tax are generally much lower than the 
administrative costs of delivering nontax subsidies.58 
In short, Congress seems hopelessly addicted to the extensive use of 
exclusions, deductions, and credits in lieu of direct spending programs—and 
thus also addicted to the existence of mass direct taxation of individuals as the 
vehicle for the delivery of subsidies. By now, the addiction seems so strong that 
even if (in some alternate universe) there were no need for a revenue-
producing direct mass tax, Congress might opt for a zero-revenue direct mass 
“tax” solely for its usefulness as a vehicle for delivering subsidies. There might 
never have been a direct mass tax,59 but once such a tax was enacted and 
Congress discovered the joys of tax expenditures, the elimination of direct mass 
taxation became very unlikely. 
 
 54. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745, 746–47 
(2007) (describing the shift in expert opinion); MCCAFFERY, supra note 43 (an example of a left-of-
center opponent of the income tax base). 
 55. Graetz, supra note 39, at 274. 
 56. Id. at 275. 
 57. Sixth Meeting of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 117–18 (2005) 
(remarks of Milton Friedman); Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate 
and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987). 
 58. See, e.g., Janet Holtzblatt, Choosing Between Refundable Tax Credits and Spending Programs, 
in 93 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N 116, 122 (2001) (comparing the substantial direct administrative 
costs of the Food Stamps program with the minimal direct administrative costs of the earned income 
tax credit). 
 59. See Zelenak, supra note 18. 
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The survival of progressive marginal rates does not seem quite as assured as 
the survival of direct mass taxation and tax expenditures. The intellectual 
foundation of progressive marginal tax rates has been undermined by optimal-
tax analysis. The objective of optimal-tax analysis60 is to determine what 
marginal tax rate structure, in combination with a system of universal cash 
transfers, will maximize a chosen social-welfare function (SWF)61 under various 
assumed conditions (relating to the distribution of wage-earning abilities in 
society, the elasticity of the labor supply, and the rate at which the marginal 
utility of money declines). Different optimal-tax simulations, based on different 
factual assumptions and using different SWFs, can produce very different levels 
of transfer payments and very different levels of taxation. However, as a leading 
optimal-tax scholar has explained, “One of the main conclusions to be drawn 
from the Mirrleesian optimal nonlinear income tax model is that it is difficult (if 
at all possible) to find a convincing argument for a progressive marginal tax rate 
structure throughout” the societal wage distribution.62 As in the case of the shift 
in expert opinion concerning the relative merits of income taxation and 
consumption taxation,63 it is difficult to predict how much—if at all—a change in 
academic views will influence political outcomes. 
Public attitudes toward progressive marginal rates are probably more 
important politically than the views of academics. In this regard it is noteworthy 
that Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, the developers of the particular 
consumption-tax proposal known as the (as opposed to a) flat tax, were 
sufficiently persuaded of the political attractiveness of a single (“flat”) rate that 
they named their tax after its rate structure, rather than follow the nearly 
universal approach of naming taxes after their bases.64 On the other hand, 
opinion polling indicates considerable public support for progressive tax rates,65 
 
 60. See, e.g., J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 175 (1971) (the seminal work in the field); MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX 
AND REDISTRIBUTION (1990) (a comprehensive monograph on optimal income taxation); Lawrence 
Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX 
L. REV. 51 (1999) (including a nontechnical introduction to optimal income tax analysis). 
 61. An SWF specifies how the well-being of individuals contributes to the overall well-being of 
society. A simple utilitarian SWF, for example, values equally the well-being of each member of 
society. At the other extreme, a “maximin” social-welfare function—commonly associated with the 
political philosophy of John Rawls—is concerned solely with the well-being of the least well-off 
members of society. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75–83, 152–56 (1971). 
 62. TUOMALA, supra note 61, at 14. For a wide range of factual assumptions and SWFs, optimal 
tax-rate structures feature rising marginal rates through the bottom decile of the wage distribution, and 
falling marginal tax rates through the remaining nine deciles. Id. at 95–99. But see Zelenak & Moreland, 
supra note 61, at 62–71 (demonstrating that optimal tax analysis does support progressive marginal tax 
rates in the absence of universal cash transfers and arguing that universal cash transfers are politically 
unrealistic in the United States). 
 63. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 64. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 36. 
 65. See Bowman, supra note 2, at 26 (reporting results of a 1981 Harris Interactive poll, in which a 
majority of respondents found it was “fair” that “higher-income people not only have to pay more in 
taxes but must pay a greater percentage of their income in taxes,” and of a 2005 AP–Ipsos poll in which 
a majority of respondents thought that those “who earn more money should pay a higher tax rate on 
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and in the quarter century since the flat tax was originally proposed66 neither the 
Hall–Rabushka tax nor any other single-rate tax has even come close to 
enactment as a replacement for the current federal income tax. The George W. 
Bush Administration, for example, demonstrated no interest in eliminating 
progressive marginal tax rates—in marked contrast with its strong interest in 
moving toward a consumption-tax base.67 
Moreover, it is debatable whether the Hall–Rabushka proposal, and other 
proposals for taxes with a single positive rate, are accurately described as flat-
rate tax proposals. In fact, the wage-tax portion of the Hall–Rabushka proposal 
(like most other so-called single-rate proposals) actually features two tax 
rates—a zero rate on subsistence-level wages produced by “a generous personal 
allowance” in the wage tax,68 and one positive rate imposed on above-
subsistence wages. Hall and Rabushka do not think this prevents their tax from 
being flat. In this respect they are intellectual heirs of Walter Blum and Harry 
Kalven, who argued that a tax applying a single positive rate above an 
exemption level was different in kind, rather than merely in degree, from a tax 
with multiple positive rates—so much so that they gave the single-positive-rate 
tax its own adjective, “degressive.”69 Despite the protestations of Hall, 
Rabushka, Blum, and Kalven, a tax featuring a single positive rate above an 
exemption level has both of the features essential to a progressive marginal tax 
rate structure—that is, the existence of more than one tax rate, and the 
application of the higher rate(s) to higher levels of income. 
A forecast limited to the next few decades might predict that (1) the survival 
of progressive marginal tax rates in the narrower sense of the term—requiring 
the existence of at least two positive rates of tax—is probable, and (2) the 
survival of progressive marginal tax rates in the broader sense of the term—as 
including the “degressive” rate structures of Blum and Kalven—is nearly 
certain. 
To sum up the probable life expectancies of the major features of the 
existing income tax: Although the income tax base is in considerable peril, two 
of the other features—mass direct taxation of individuals and the continued 
availability of an array of exclusions, directions, and credits—are almost certain 
to survive for decades, and the final feature—progressive marginal rates—is 
more likely than not to survive. If the income tax base disappears, but two or 
three of the remaining features persist, would the resulting tax still be the 
 
their incomes than people who earn less.” 
 66. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1st ed., 1985). 
 67. The Executive Order creating the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 
instructed the Panel that its proposals should be “appropriately progressive.” Exec. Order No. 13,369, 
70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005).  By contrast, the order indicated the panel could offer one or more 
non–income tax proposals, as long as it offered at least one option “us[ing] the Federal income tax as 
the base for its recommended reforms.” Id. 
 68. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 36, at 54. 
 69. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 417, 506–16 (1952). 
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income tax? Reasonable minds can differ on the answer to that question. There 
is much to be said, however, in favor of a “yes” answer. The survival of an 
income base, as contrasted with a consumption base or a wage base, may not be 
necessary to the survival of the core of the current federal income tax. There is 
no objective way of determining something as amorphous as the essence of a 
tax system, so there is no reason to expect a consensus as to whether the essence 
of the income tax would have survived in various possible futures. The 
argument offered in this foreword is negative—not in favor of any particular 
view of the essence of the current federal income tax, but against the 
assumption that the “income tax” label captures the essence of the tax. 
The focus here is on the survival of essential features, not of labels; but it 
would not be surprising if the income tax label—as well as the income tax 
essence—survived the decline and fall of the income tax base. Suppose that 
over the next few decades Congress gradually slouched away from an income 
tax base, eventually arriving at a point at which the tax base could no longer be 
fairly described as income, but without disturbing the other key features of the 
current system. It would be reasonable to conclude that the core of the current 
tax system had survived, even if tax experts would say the tax was no longer an 
income tax. It also seems likely that the income tax label would survive the 
gradual dismantling of the income tax base. A cynic might attribute the survival 
of the income tax label to the boiling frog effect—just as urban legend claims 
that a frog will allow itself to be boiled to death as long as the water 
temperature is raised gradually,70 perhaps the income tax label can endure as 
long as the income tax base is gradually eroded. But the label might also survive 
for a better reason. The income tax label may have come to be understood 
nonliterally—as a shorthand reference to the several key features of the current 
tax system, rather than as a literal description of the base of the tax. There are 
instances of things being named after nonessential features, losing those 
nonessential features, and retaining their names—think of the nongreen 
greenrooms of television fame,71 or (for tax aficionados) the nonblue bluebooks 
produced by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.72 Perhaps the income 
tax is destined to become another example of that phenomenon. 
 
 
 70. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Boiling the Frog, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, at A19 (“Real frogs will, 
in fact, jump out of the pot—but never mind. The hypothetical boiled frog is a useful metaphor . . . .”). 
 71. See William Safire, The Greenroom Effect, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 23, 1989, at 16 (explaining 
that the use of the term in the theater predates the advent of television by several centuries, that the 
term may or may not have been based on the wall color of early greenrooms (the origins of the term 
are lost in the mists of time), and that the term is routinely used today even when nothing in a 
particular greenroom is actually green). 
 72. Bluebooks are prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee of Taxation to describe recently 
enacted tax legislation. See, e.g., Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of Tax 
Legislation Enacted in the 110th Congress (JCS-1-09). Their covers are frequently gray, but that does 
not affect their status as bluebooks. 
